#9
THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION
Prism: a monthly on the post-Soviet states
July 2001 Volume VII, Issue 7 Part 3
WILL THE "NEW PARTNERSHIP" SUCCEED?
By Sergei Oznobishchev
Sergei Oznobishchev is director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments.
The Russian-American summit that took place in June near Ljubljana did not
vindicate pessimistic forecasts, though these were not unfounded. Here is a
typical summary, made just prior to the summit by a respected news agency,
of an analysis of assessments offered in the media of various countries: "In
the West, just as in Russia, there are no illusions regarding the summit in
Slovenia. British and American newspapers believe that the very fact that
the presidents will meet personally should be counted a success. Journalists
[after all] describe the positions of Putin and Bush as irreconcilable."
How is it, then, that this irreconcilability developed so quickly and with
such apparent ease into almost undisguised friendliness? I do not think that
the two presidents are such accomplished artists that they put on for the
whole world a beautifully acted performance that might be called "Shoots of
Friendship." No, for all the conventions of these high level meetings, and
the need for official smiles and overly long handshakes for the cameras, not
even the greatest masters of the stage--not just the political stage--could
have put on such a sincere show of mutual rapport. Objectively, the rapid
deterioration in relations between our countries, where the political elites
practically wrote each other off as potential partners in international
business, did not augur well for a favorable outcome. In decisionmaking
circles there were decidedly anti-American and anti-Russian feelings in
Moscow and Washington respectively. Giving a paper at the Gorbachev
Foundation in May this year, I offered the hypothesis, which many people did
not think justified at the time, that there may turn out to be more
subjective preconditions than objective ones for an appreciable improvement
in Russian-American relations today.
In the end, that is how it turned out. There has been a historical precedent
for this, incidentally--when amidst mutual recriminations and a high degree
of confrontation in the 1980s (suffice to recall the epithet of the "evil
empire" coined in Washington to describe the other side), Reagan and
Gorbachev managed to move towards an end to the Cold War.
There is an internal contradiction in the very concept of the "new
partnership" of the title. It implies that there used to be some sort of
"old" partnership that was somehow forfeited. This was indeed the case in
the early 1990s when Yeltsin declared that Russia and the United States were
partners, allies and even friends. But despite such proclamations,
American-Russian relations throughout the 1990s showed consistency in only
one respect: They were consistently deteriorating. Russian politicians and
analysts became increasingly aggrieved with Western leaders for their
attempts to exclude Russia from the decisionmaking process on fundamental
European and international issues. The main reasons for this were the
selfish policy of NATO expansion (despite fierce opposition on the part of
Russia) and the use of force to resolve the Kosovo crisis, bypassing UN
procedures and opinion in Moscow. Meanwhile, Yeltsin's inconsistency in
securing domestic ratification of foreign policy agreements meant that the
West came to rely less and less on Russia. As a consequence, the whole
process of reducing and destroying weapons came to almost a complete
standstill. The use of force to resolve the parliamentary crisis in 1993,
the start of the Chechen war, and the frequent illnesses and
"disappearances" of the Russian president forced the West to adopt an
increasingly cautious--even wary--attitude to Moscow. Essentially relations
between the countries--especially after spy scandals, diplomatic incidents,
exposures and mutual expulsions--were balanced precariously on the edge of a
"cold peace," with the clear potential to descend into a farcical cold war
(there would hardly have been sufficient grounds or funds for a full-scale
cold war like that of the 1960s and 1970s).
But Putin and Bush took a liking to each other, which immediately presented
an opportunity for a constructive solution to longstanding problems. Behind
the outward displays of friendliness, of course, lay an understanding of the
fact that the absence even of pragmatic interaction (or "equal cooperation,"
as recent Russian national security documents like to put it) condemns us to
live in a much more dangerous and unpredictable world, and pushes us towards
excessive military spending.
The two presidents surprised many people by going far beyond the bounds of
the official business of making each other's acquaintance and exchanging the
views they had prepared back at home. The main achievement of Putin and Bush
was to avoid getting bogged down in the details of the mutual recriminations
that had been building up, and to talk seriously about the fundamentals of
the U.S.-Russian relationship. For decades, relations between the two
countries suffered because politicians would, for the sake of appearances,
get actively involved in secondary issues rather than solve the fundamental
issues between them. It may be said, for example, that in the context of the
problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which has yet to be
effectively resolved, building a missile defense system is one individual
option and certainly not the most effective way of handling this
increasingly alarming phenomenon. Or, for example, a balanced analysis of
NATO expansion would probably reveal that this is the last of a whole range
of possible instruments for encouraging the process of "expanding democracy"
to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and giving them back their
European identity.
This set approach meant that Russian-American relations were too often
teetering on the brink of crisis, and periods of declared partnership were
quickly superseded by tension. Moreover, one result of the longstanding,
unenterprising and at the same time self-centered policy with regard to
Russia was the renewed "ideologization" of relations, in the sense that any
decisions or measures taken by one party was automatically perceived
negatively by the other. Far too many unresolved problems and issues of
varying importance piled up, undermining relations; this is further evidence
of how all has not been well for a long time.
Prior to the summit, some analysts, including myself, suggested a practical
platform for future Russian-American cooperation: "To begin seeking a
consensus on the fundamental concepts in the field of politics and security,
on the priorities in terms of the threats and challenges to the security of
both countries, and on measures to tackle them together. This work should be
accompanied by dialog at all possible levels, and discussions should begin
immediately to agree on its specific forms" (see Chto delat's Amerikoi?
[What is to be done with America?], S. Oznobishchev, I. Runov, Dipkurier NG,
supplement to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 24, 2001). It turned out that the two
sides adopted this very principle as the basis for their initial follow-up
actions after the summit. At the postsummit press conference, President
Vladimir Putin described the understanding reached on this issue as follows:
"We must think together about the threats and concerns--we must define what
the threats are, see where they are, and then decide how to confront them.
It is better to do this together: To identify a common platform, and then
look for a joint solution." If the proposed "fundamental" approach to
building bilateral relations triumphs, then the creation of a missile
defense system and the expansion of NATO will simply be individual issues in
the context of a joint security program. And if the two sides decide to
resort to such measures, it will only be on the basis of a joint decision,
and whether they consider these actions prudent if other mechanisms for
ensuring security do not work.
It was the gap between word and deed in the 1990s that made the bilateral
"strategic partnership"--about which so much was said--impossible. It seems
that this time the opportunity is there to avoid past mistakes. This
opportunity lies in the established "vertical of executive power" in Russia,
and in the far broader opportunities the president now has for carrying out
his international promises--as we have already seen with the ratification of
the START II, nuclear test ban and "open skies" treaties, which Yeltsin was
unable to achieve over many years.
There is every reason to suppose that, however much the bureaucracy moans
and however much individual politicians pontificate, Putin will manage to
quash the domestic opposition to cooperation with the United States that has
gained force over the last few years. He will undoubtedly be helped by
pragmatic considerations: Russia, which is striving to take its rightful
place among other leading states, cannot achieve this without intensive
contacts with the West, first and foremost the United States. Possible
routes towards compromise began mapping themselves out immediately after the
meeting was over. Speaking at the press conference, Putin once again
conceded the possibility of Russia joining NATO. This paradoxical solution
may contain a way out of the impasse that has been reached: Russia's
involvement in NATO will serve to change the nature of the organization,
giving it a truly pan-European character and rendering its expansion
acceptable.
At the same time, after this European tour the U.S. position was toned down.
Having visited Madrid, Brussels, Gothenburg and Warsaw before Ljubljana,
George W. Bush had obviously failed to secure clear support for his missile
defense plans, which have not yet finally been formulated. It is worth
remembering that in the 1980s too, European leaders seriously toned down
attempts by the Reagan administration to erode the limitations of the
antimissile treaty.
There are still a great many steps to be taken on the road to establishing
new relations and producing a joint strategy, which the U.S. president hopes
will happen. Both leaders effectively announced a program of joint measures,
which, it is to be hoped, will be developed and enhanced from meeting to
meeting, and from summit to summit, the dates of which have also been
penciled in. It should not be forgotten that while relations can be
destroyed very quickly, improving them is a long and complex process. This
means that we will all need a great deal of patience before we can gain
confidence in each other and really learn to work together rather than
adopting diametrically opposed stances on practically every issue.
The presidents laid down their fundamental, common position: Russia and the
United States are not enemies, and are no threat to each other, but are
partners and may well become allies. What was said is nothing less than a
reversal in our mutual perception of each other. Anyone who doubts this
would do well to take a look at the national security documents of the two
countries over the last few years: The contrast in the perception and
categorization of the two sides will be truly striking.
Having once again initiated discussions of partnership, it is important that
the two sides do not limit themselves to discussions, but begin to create a
stable, positive equilibrium, moving onto concrete, practical measures. It
would seem that the two sides are set to move in that direction: Bush and
Putin agreed to instruct their ministers to continue working not only on
specific security issues, but also on other prospective issues, including
trade and economics. Here not only America but Russia too will need to do a
lot to create reliable conditions for investment and business development.
Putin acknowledged this.
In broad terms, Russia and the United States will have to do a great deal to
adjust their image in order to be seen by the other side as a real partner,
because without this it will be impossible to establish respectful and
trusting relations. Russia will have to assuage U.S. fears in respect of the
provision of basic rights and freedoms, first and foremost freedom of the
press. Attempts to "privatize" independently run media outlets by structures
controlled by the state do not reflect well on Russia's image in the West.
It should not be forgotten that for our Western arms control partners, the
level of press freedom and basic rights and freedoms are an important
element in assessing the possibility of cooperation with a particular state,
and the extent of that cooperation. Although the application of this
criterion in western politics is often relative and on a case-by-case basis,
it has nevertheless been seen to play a role in foreign policy decisions in
Western capitals on a number of occasions.
For their part, Western leaders must always be aware that while Russian
politics today is becoming more defined, it is still--just like the
country--in a state of transition where its priorities are being determined.
In this state it is very dependent on the actions of the West. In fact,
actions taken by Western leaders today, whether constructive or not, are
capable of exerting a very considerable influence on the direction of
Russian politics tomorrow.
In this context, Western politicians should understand that if they continue
the shortsighted and self-centered policies of the 1990s, they will create
huge problems for themselves in Russia and elsewhere. Only a joint
determination to eradicate the concerns of the other side will be capable of
converting the theory of partnership into practice. This summit meeting has
resurrected that hope.
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#10
The Russia Journal
www.russiajournal.com
July 27-Auguste 2, 2001
‘Spying damages relations more than before’
Ex-CIA chief speaks out on NATO and U.S.-Russia cooperation
By YURY SIGOV
With the fall of the Soviet Union now a decade behind us, relations between
Moscow and Washington are still tense. In the second installment of a
two-part interview, The Russia Journal talks with retired Adm. Stansfield
Turner, director of the CIA from 1977-81 and a man who has seen the
friction from the inside.
Turner, who headed the agency when Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter held
the reins of power, had earlier served as commander of the U.S. 2nd Fleet
and commanded NATO’s southern flank.
During his time at the CIA, he controversially modernized its operational
methods, steering its information-gathering toward "technical collection
systems" including satellites and bugging devices, and cutting back on the
use of human operatives in a bid to get one up on the KGB.
In this interview, conducted in Washington, he discusses NATO expansion,
Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush and future relations between
the two powers.
The Russia Journal:
Russia believes that NATO expansion is a major threat
to its security. While official documents in Russia take this line, NATO is
inching closer to the country’s borders, and 2003 is set to mark a new wave
of expansion. How can Moscow resolve this issue – should it oppose NATO
politically and militarily or seek to become a member itself?
Adm. Stansfield Turner:
I personally don’t support any further NATO
expansion; I think [Russia] should have more time to adapt to this. NATO
should be more patient about enlarging its ranks. I would like this process
to be slowed down, but NATO is expanding, and it is a reality. Meanwhile,
you have to understand why the Europeans are so anxious to join NATO.
Several years ago in Prague during a conference I met former Polish
President Lech Walesa. I asked him directly: "Why do you want to be in
NATO?" And he replied almost immediately: "Because the Russians will be back".
But bear in mind, too, that there are more [ethnic] Polish voters in this
country [the United States] than there are Russian voters. And they are
influential in America, and they have more political power in the States
than Russians do.
I don’t know why NATO still exists. We created it because of a threat from
the Soviet Union. Now the U.S.S.R. doesn’t exist anymore. And, again, I
don’t like it, but I predict that NATO will continue to expand.
RJ:
During their summit in Slovenia, Presidents Vladimir Putin and George
W. Bush seemed to establish good personal relations. The Russian president
was praised at home for the way he handled his meeting with the U.S.
president, while Bush was criticized at home for being taken in by
spymaster Putin. Did the presidents really find a common language, or did
they just play to the cameras for their own PR campaigns?
ST:
I think that in this case we have two amateur politicians who came to
face the realities of their duties and the complex world around them. And
this reality is very simple: The countries should get along with each
other, talk to each other and not spit at each other. Before they met for
the first time, everybody expected that they would spit at each other. It’s
good that they talked, and that they acted as responsible leaders. They
promised to meet more, and this is good.
RJ:
Given Putin’s KGB past, will Americans ever feel they can trust him?
ST:
You remember how President [Richard] Nixon went to China in 1972 and
opened this country for America. He was a Republican, nobody thought he
could do that, but he did. I think that Putin, being a former KGB officer,
can do much more for cooperation between the CIA and KGB than any other
Russian president.
RJ:
Before the elections in the United States, George W. Bush was portrayed
in the Russian media as an ignorant politician who didn’t know the names of
world leaders and countries and almost never traveled abroad. Is he really
like that, and how will he handle relations with Russia?
ST:
Of course, Bush is much smarter than many people think. Speaking about
Russia, his background shows quite strong anti-Soviet feelings, since he
represents this wing of the Republican Party. But he is changing. He is
listening to the advice of his close teammates; he knows that it would be
bad to be in a conflict with Russia. He believes that we can trust Russia
now. We are not afraid of Russia because it is too weak, and so let’s
cooperate.
RJ:
But with all this "trust" in Russians, Bush expelled 50 Russian
diplomats earlier this year, accusing them of spying; and the action
seriously damaged relations between Moscow and Washington. Can there be any
trust between our two countries if we are still spying on each other?
ST:
You know, during the Cold War we did this kind of thing, expelling
spies from America. We expected that you were spying on us and you expected
that we were spying on you. Now that the Cold War is over, we are supposed
to spy on each other less. Ironically, it is more costly to relations
between the countries to catch spies in the post-Cold war era than it was
before.
When I was CIA director, sometimes we expelled other people, sometimes we
exchanged them for others, like it was in the case of [Natan] Scharansky,
who was exchanged for your people who were in our jail being caught for
spying.
I don’t know what real harm [Robert] Hanssen did to us, but the newspapers
wrote that he did something terrible. In this country people read these
stories and believe that this man really did something horrible. Hanssen
did something wrong being an American. But people should know that the KGB
has considerably increased the number of its people here in the States,
especially in Washington. And Americans think that has happened because of
Putin, because he is from the KGB. The U.S. president had to react to this,
and Bush did what he thought was appropriate.
RJ:
Instead of spying on each other, couldn’t our intelligence agencies
cooperate more in fighting international crime and other common threats?
ST:
Fighting international terrorism could be one of these issues.
Cooperation in intelligence is very difficult. I know about this as a
former CIA director. Special services are not willing to trust each other,
but it would be possible to cooperate in the terrorism field. Neither
Russia nor the United States can do this job on its own. How could they do
it? For example, the FSB might get a tip that a Ukrainian scientist went
for a vacation to Iraq. The Germans might find a company selling fusion
equipment to Baghdad. There could be other tips from other sources. Later,
we could analyze this information and act jointly.
In this cooperation, there should be a precondition – in order to keep the
trust between two agencies we shouldn’t try to identify our sources from
which we got this information. We just share information and cooperate,
keeping our secrets secret. So, the fight against international terrorism
is an obvious field where we could cooperate.
Narcotics are another aspect. We are vulnerable, and we could get important
information from Russia in order to fight this evil.
RJ:
Will U.S.-Russia relations be better after the Putin-Bush meeting in
Genoa, or will we still be looking at each other with suspicion and mistrust?
I think much will depend on the state of the Russian economy. If your
economy improves, that will be good. If you fail, Russia will blame the
United States for not helping. Currently, your success depends much more on
Moscow than Washington.
You know, when the U.S.S.R. collapsed, it was a big and unexpected issue
for us. Of course, we knew that the Soviet economy was in a very bad shape.
It was not a problem for the CIA to understand that. But we couldn’t
imagine that public opinion in the Soviet Union would have had the impact
it did and bring the government down.
(Yury Sigov is U.S. bureau chief for Novye Izvestia.)
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#11
US Department of State
27 July 2001
Text: Commerce's Evans at American Chamber of Commerce in Russia 7/27
(U.S., Russia have opportunity to improve commercial relations) (2730)
The United States and Russia have a "window of opportunity" to take
their commercial relations to "a new level as ... recent market
reforms by the Duma and President [Vladimir] Putin take hold," said
U.S. Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans in Moscow July 27.
Evans, speaking before the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia,
announced that he will be leading a trade mission to Russia in
mid-October 2001 - his first as Commerce Secretary - "to send the
signal that the time has come to expand our commercial ties here."
After praising Russia for making major reforms in fiscal policy and
cutting taxes, Evans said the U.S. Commerce Department "will continue
to work with Russia to revamp its tax system through our bilateral
commercial tax-working group."
Two other items high on the U.S.-Russia trade agenda are Russian entry
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the need for an effective
tax and regulatory framework that would allow foreign energy companies
to enter into production sharing arrangements with Russia, he said.
Evans also explained that the top item on the Bush Administration's
trade agenda is securing from Congress Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
-- also known as "fast track" because it would permit the Bush
administration to negotiate trade agreements that Congress cannot
amend, but can only approve or reject by a given deadline.
Evans concluded his remarks by talking about the relationship between
trade and democratic values, calling free and open trade "a foundation
for democracy and political stability."
"Just imagine what free trade could accomplish here in this vast
country of Russia," Evans said. "Think of the new jobs ... the new
wealth ... the new consumer choices ... and the new confidence that
all these things would bring. It would be a victory for human dignity,
and for human liberty."
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