FISSILE MATERIAL DISPOSITION & CIVIL USE OF PLUTONIUM

• Introduction
• Main Story: THE MOX PROGRAM AND THE "REACTOR OPTION"
• I. What is the MOX Program?
• II. Why is MOX An Option for the Disposal of Fissile Materials?
• III. What are DOE's Plans for "Reactor Option"?
• IV. Cost Analysis of the "Reactor Option"
• V. The Schedule Towards Record of Decision
• NEWS BRIEFS
• Notes
• Sources

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) plans to announce a Record of Decision on what to do with the 50 tons of "excess" plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads by the end of this year. Though reports and studies published by DOE have not put any emphasis on specific disposition alternatives, it is quite obvious, with industry's interests, that the reactor option is ranked high among the other options, which are immobilization and deep borehole storage. The Update will look into these alternatives, with a special focus on the reactor option, and all other related activities including reprocessing, research & developments and political decisions on waste disposal and storage.

The Update intends to provide the readers a total vision of fissile material disposition and civil use of plutonium, so that we could identify each individual movements on the local level within the context of the global nuclear politics, and what implications they have on our daily lives. It would also bring special attention to the wide-ranging activities of British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) and Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires (COGEMA), the two largest reprocessors and plutonium enterprises in the world, who are aggressively trying to get into the "disarmament" market in the US and Russia.

MOX is an abbreviation for mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel, a form in which plutonium is used as fuel for the civilian reactors. From the dawn of the "Atoms for Peace" program, the ultimate objective was to close the nuclear fuel cycle. This means to separate plutonium from spent uranium fuel by reprocessing, fabricate into fuel, and burn it in fast breeder reactors (FBR), which would produce more plutonium than consumed. The plutonium created in the spent FBR fuel will be separated again by reprocessing, and the separated plutonium would be used as fuel again. Thus the fuel cycle would go round and round in a closed cycle.

Many countries, especially Japan with no natural energy resources of its own, launched into this project to create an "infinite energy source." Britain and France started reprocessing for countries who did not have a reprocessing facility of their own. Germany and Japan became the biggest foreign clients for BNFL and COGEMA's reprocessing business.

However, the FBR project has failed in every country because of technical difficulties in maintaining safety and control, and high economic costs of overcoming these technical problems. As a result, the countries that have pursued this path are now stuck with excess plutonium extracted from spent fuel under the reprocessing contracts they made more than twenty years ago.

In order to use up the plutonium already separated and the plutonium yet to be separated according to the contracts, the utilities decided to burn it in conventional light water reactors (LWR), namely the MOX program. Originally, this was meant to be a bridging program to fill the time and technical gap moving from LWRs into the plutonium economy which uses FBRs. However, now that the FBR projects have virtually collapsed, the MOX program has become the major part of the plutonium economy.

All nuclear fuel containing plutonium is MOX, including those for the FBRs, but "MOX Program" usually means utilization in LWRs. The difference is the component of the fuel. The content of plutonium for FBR fuels is in the range of 35%, whereas for LWRs, it is 4 to 6 %. (1)

Currently, France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Netherlands, UK, and Japan are the countries involved in the MOX program. (Details of these programs will come in the next issue.)

In 1994, the US National Academy of Sciences reviewed various excess weapons plutonium disposition options, and concluded in its report "Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium,"(2) that weapons-grade plutonium would be most proliferation resistant when it is "as inaccessible for weapons use as the much larger and growing quantity of plutonium that exists in spent fuel from commercial reactors." They determined that plutonium for disposition should meet this "spent fuel standard." The two most promising methods for achieving this standard are to use it as fuel in existing or modified reactors, or to mix it with high level waste and bring it back to the original spent fuel. The NAS report described a third option - burial in deep boreholes, but concluded that this needed more study.

Based on the NAS report, the DOE defined its goal in the Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS)(3) "to make the plutonium as unattractive and inaccessible for retrieval and weapons use as the residual plutonium in the spent fuel from commercial reactors," and conducted extensive studies on all options, which are Deep Borehole Category, Immobilization Category, Reactor Category, and No Action Category. The options elaborated in the most recent published Technical Summary Report (4) are Deep Borehole Alternatives, Immobilization Alternatives, Reactor Alternatives, and Hybrid Alternatives, which is a combination of the reactor and the immobilization alternatives.

Though DOE has examined all options, great emphasis has been put on the reactor option. For example, the Technical Summary Report says, immobilization, which means to fix plutonium in various matrices such as glass with spent fuel in large canisters for disposal in high-level waste repositories, will "require additional research and development prior to implementation."

And for the deep borehole alternatives, in which the plutonium is emplaced at depths of several kilometers, "the most significant uncertainties relate to selecting and qualifying a site and to obtaining the requisite licensing approvals."

But for the reactor option, the report says, "existing light water reactors can be readily converted to enable the use of MOX fuels," and for technical risks that relate with this option, "they are all amenable to engineering resolution." The Draft PEIS, describes the "Reactor Category" as follows: "The irradiated MOX fuel would meet the Spent Fuel Standard *to reduce the proliferation risks of the plutonium material, and the reactors would also generate revenues through the sale of electricity*."(emphasis added by the author)

In the DOE's Technical Report, five variants are considered for the reactor option:

• 5 existing LWRs with existing facilities (5) for plutonium processing and fuel fabrication
• 4 existing LWRs with greenfield facilities (6), which suggests "new co-functional plutonium processing facility and MOX fabrication plant"
• 2 partially complete LWRs, using existing facilities on DOE site for plutonium processing and fuel fabrication
• 2 evolutionary LWRs using existing facilities on DOE site
• CANDUs (7) using existing facilities on DOE site.

Major drawbacks of the reactor option for the US are that there are no fabrication plants in operation, nor any LWRs licensed to handle plutonium fuel. Facilities in Europe could be used at the initial stage, but because of their limited fabrication capacity, a new US facility would eventually be necessary. Plutonium processing and MOX fuel fabrication can be constructed at a greenfield site, or at an existing site.

At a meeting held for citizens to discuss this issue with DOE (8), the existing facility DOE suggested to be used for plutonium processing (pit disassembly) was TA55 facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. For MOX fuel fabrication, DOE suggested the Fuel and Materials Examination Facility at Hanford, the empty building at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Pantex, and Savannah River Site (SRS). At SRS, the facilities mentioned as possible locations for both plutonium processing and fuel fabrication were the New Special Recovery Facility and 221F canyon. (9)

According to the Technical Report, about 60 or more of the 110 commercial reactors in operation in the US, could be used for the a) and b) option. As few as three reactors are needed to complete the mission in 24 to 31 years. However, the Technical Report seems to rule out partially and evolutionary LWR options because they both need time to complete construction and licensing procedures and the technical risks do exist arising from lack of experiences and uncertainties.

The Report seems to also rule out the CANDU option since there is no industrial experience and more research & development is necessary. It is also more expensive than using other types of reactors. Moreover, the CANDU reactors have lower burnup compared to conventional LWRs, which would mean that the isotopic composition of plutonium in the spent MOX fuel would remain closer to that of weapons-grade plutonium than LWRs.

The Technical Summary Report analyzes the cost for each of the options. However, the assumptions are far optimistic and unrealistic. For example, the cost to design, license, and modify a MOX fuel facility at an existing facility is estimated to be US$400 million. DOE said the figure is based on the actual costs of MELOX plant of France, Sellafield MOX Plant of BNFL, and P1 of Belgonucleaire. Though this is the cost to modify an existing facility and not to construct a brand new facility, it still seems to be fairly optimistic. Actually, the NAS Report, which was written two years ago, says the estimate given for a new facility which was between US$400 million and US$1.2 billion to be "almost certainly optimistic."

Furthermore, they have not included any incremental or incentive costs that they would have to pay to the utilities to "buy their services." The "Fuel Displacement Credit," which is subtracted from the total cost in the analysis, is meant to be equivalent to the uranium fuel which the utilities have to buy anyway in order to operate their nuclear power plants. So the assumption of the Technical Report is that the utilities would pay DOE this amount in exchange of MOX fuel.

At the Sept.10 meeting with DOE, non-governmental groups pointed out that some of the utilities are assuming the MOX fuel to be free, and that they may even get subsidies for taking this mission. DOE has actually included a detailed list of the estimated charges it would cover in return for the use of MOX fuel, when they asked utilities to express interest in taking the mission. This cost is estimated to be approximately US$825 million per reactor through 2024, with the greatest cost being the waiver of the utilities' contribution to the Nuclear Waste Fund ($310 million). (10)

However, DOE responded that they have not decided anything, they do not know how much MOX fuel would cost, since "there is no market cost for MOX yet," and that they could determine this only after they decide to take this option and procurement was started.

Nevertheless, DOE was clear on NOT subsidizing for any retrofitting or repairs related to generating energy using MOX fuel in the reactors. They were also clear on NOT preparing any other economic documents to correct the insufficiencies of the Technical Report. This means that Secretary O'Leary would have to make a decision without any real-term economic analysis.

The Department of Energy is scheduled to make a Record of Decision on the disposition alternative in December, 96. The Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement is due in November, and the Draft Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-usable Fissile Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition Alternatives (11) is to be published in early October. Public meetings to discuss this Non-proliferation Draft Assessment will be held from October 28 to November 6 (12), and the results will be presented to Secretary O'Leary on November 12.

All in all, the schedule is tight. At the Sept.10 meeting with DOE, non-governmental groups raised the issue that there is actually too little time to adequately incorporate public comments, but the DOE's response was that "people" had been thinking about nonproliferation implications of various options for a long time. We also asked whether their plans are in correspondence with the Russian program. They said that they are negotiating with the Russians, and that they will not make a unilateral decision. However, they want to make some kind of a decision before the inauguration of the next administration, so that they could submit a budget proposal in February 1997. They also said that they want a record of decision and preparations in place to show how the US will move forward in order to be in a better negotiating position with the Russians.

The impression from the Sept 10 meeting was that DOE has already made its decision: "Hybrid Option" using both MOX and immobilization. This choice leaves room to sway between the two options. For instance, if the utilities come up with an unacceptable proposal, they would go for vitrification, but if the Russians don't agree to go for this option, they can come back to MOX.

What the DOE officials repeatedly stressed was that this was a mission ONLY to dispose excess weapons plutonium and that they would offer legislation to make this clear. However, the impact of the DOE's plutonium disposition decision will clearly affect US non-proliferation policy and it may -- if the reactor option is selected -- adversely affect US and global security, enhancing the plutonium economy on a worldwide scale.

DOE issued a statement last December asking the utilities for proposals for DOE acquisition of one or more commercial reactors for production of tritium (a radioactive gas to boost the explosive power of nuclear weapons). At the same time, DOE asked for proposals in involving reactors capable of burning MOX fuel fabricated from surplus weapons plutonium, so that an existing LWR can be configured to produce tritium, consume plutonium as fuel, and generate revenue through the production of electricity.

By the end of March, 1996, thirteen utilities expressed interest in tritium production (Arizona Public Service Co., Centerior Energy (OH), Florida Power & Light Co., Georgia Power Co., Houston Lighting & Power, Illinois Power Co., Niagara Mohawk Power Co.(NY), North Carolina Municipal Power Agency Number 1/ Piedmont Municipal Power Agency, South Carolina Electric & Gas, Tennessee Valley Authority, Virginia Power, Wisconsin Public Service Co., Washington Public Power Supply System) and fifteen utilities in burning excess weapons plutonium (Arizona Public Service Co., Centerior Energy, Duke Power/Commonwealth Edison Company (MS), Entergy Operations Inc.(LA), Florida Power & Light Co., Georgia Power Co., IES Utilities, Inc.(IA), Niagara Mohawk Power Co., N.C.MPA/Piedmont MPA, PECO Energy Co.(PA), Southern Nuclear Operating Co.(AL), Tennessee Valley Authority, Virginia Power, Wisconsin Public Service Co., WPPSS). Outside of utilities, eight private entities expressed interest including Westinghouse, ABB-Combustion Engineering, Utility Resource Associates, with five interested only in MOX (AECL Technologies/ Team CANDU, COGEMA, BNFL, Belgonucleaire, and Lockheed Martin INEL). (13)

However, according to Greenpeace International, Florida Power and Houston Lighting have decided later not to take part in this program, and Arizona Public Service responded to the DOE's inquiry only "to obtain additional information on these programs," and "has not volunteered to produce tritium for DOE."(14) Accordingly, very little interest was shown by the utilities to the tritium production Request for Proposals issued by DOE on April 26, 1996.

The DOE will publish the final PEIS in November and will then issue a record of decision for disposition of plutonium. In the meantime, utility interests and foreign MOX fabricators are pushing hard for the reactor option. Commonwealth Edison and Duke Power actually expressed interest at the first proposal and said they have aligned with COGEMA and BNFL to study burning MOX in their reactors. (15)

The director of Pantex for the Texas governor's office held a meeting in August 96 to inform the participants about DOE's ideas about using fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons to make MOX fuels. Pantex is the US nuclear weapons assembly/disassembly plant at Amarillo, Texas. The meeting was sponsored by the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium and originally convened for regulators, not citizens. But pressed by citizens groups in Texas and by Greenpeace International, it was opened to the public. About 40 people attended, including representatives from citizens groups. The presentations were given by scientists from Los Alamos as well as officials from COGEMA and BNFL. The governor himself has not indicated a preference on whether the plant should be used for MOX production. The DOE's Draft PEIS includes Pantex as a candidate site for a MOX facility and states that there would be potential adverse environmental impacts for land and water resources if the facility were constructed there.

For more information, contact Peace Farm (806-335-1715) or Greenpeace International(202-319-2506).

1. The MOX Industry or The Civilian Use of Plutonium, Christian Kuppers & Michael Sailer , International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 1994.
2. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy Press, 1994.
3. Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, US DOE, February 1996.
4. Technical Summary Report For Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, US DOE, July 17, 1996.
5. An "existing" facility means one with extensive plutonium handling infrastructure.
6. Greenfield facility is one located at an existing DOE site with limited plutonium handling infrastructure.
7. CANadian Deuterium-Uranium Reactor, using heavy water as coolant and moderator. The Canadian government has expressed interest in using their reactors for burning plutonium fuel.
8. Held on September 10, 1996 at DOE.
9. Notes from the meeting, by Maureen Eldredge of Military Production Network (tel:202-833-4668)
10. NCSL(National Conference State Legislature) High-Level Radioactive Waste Newsletter, July 1996.
11. This assessment is being conducted by the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation of DOE to identify the nuclear nonproliferation benefits and vulnerabilities associated with each of the options illustrated in the Draft PEIS. This assessment is not conducted as part of the formal National Environmental Policy Act process, but the outline of the assessment was released for public comments in July, 1996.
12. Public hearings will be held at Las Vegas, Idaho Falls and Oakland (10/28), at Hanford and Portland (10/30), in Washington DC (11/1), at Pantex and Rocky Flats (11/4), and at Oak Ridge and Savannah River (11/6).
13. DOE 3/28/96, Greenpeace International Press Release 3/29/96.
14. Letter to Tom Clements, Greenpeace International, September 3, 1996 (Contact:202-319-2506)
15. Nucleonics Week, April 4, 1996

• UPI 8/17/96
• Amarillo Daily News 8/30/96
• Citizens' Joint Statement 8/29/96 (202-898-0150, ext226)
• Nucleonics Week 9/12/96

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