STEVE SAPIENZA: What does that mean, operational status, and do we need our nuclear weapons on operational status?

Ambassador PAUL WARNKE: Operational status means that they're ready to be launched. In other words, were the President to decide that he wanted to launch against an enemy, they're available and can be launched.

MR. SAPIENZA: And that's the way it is today?

Ambassador WARNKE: That's right. It's like having a loaded -- a loaded pistol.

MR. SAPIENZA: Are these weapons pointed at anyone?

Ambassador WARNKE: Oh, yes. Yeah. Most of them are still pointed at targets in Russia. I'm sure there are many pointed at targets in China.

MR. SAPIENZA: So, during the Cold War we had this sort of head to head competition where we had the escalation, the arms race.

Ambassador WARNKE: That's right.

MR. SAPIENZA: When a couple of big treaties that tried to put a cap on it and start limiting, you know, the arms build up. What happened -- why in the post Cold War era do we not see any movement as, you know, a public citizen, how come you don't really see any movement, any reduction or drastic talks about reduction in our nuclear arsenals around the world?

Ambassador WARNKE: Well, we are, of course, have -- have pending the Start Two Treaty, Start One is already in effect. They were both negotiated during the Bush Administration. And even after Start Two, we'd have something, oh, in excess of 3,500 operational nuclear weapons ready to launch. And many, many thousands more, of course, in a reserve stockpile. And the thing is that Start Two which is now pending has not been ratified by the Duma], by the Russian parliament. And we are reluctant to negotiate a further reduction treaty until Start Two is ratified and formally in effect.

MR. SAPIENZA: What are the impediments to -- to moving forward?

Ambassador WARNKE: Not really. Inertia more than anything else. And I think probably too much reliance on the formal treaty process itself. See, great progress was made at one point in the Bush Administration in cutting back on these so-called tactical nuclear weapons, strategically the ones that are aimed at targets in the other country. Tactical, of course, are more battlefield weapons or weapons to engage in nuclear warfare at sea. And what President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev did is to agree to a very substantial reduction in the tactical nuclear weapons. For example, we took all of our tactical nuclear weapons off of ships. So the only nuclear weapons that remain in our fleet now are the submarine-launched ballistic missiles. And we cut out all of the -- all of the short range nuclear missiles stationed in Europe and we have nothing left except some airborne nuclear missiles.

MR. SAPIENZA: Where should we go today from the current situation with regard to arms control negotiations? Where should we be headed?

Ambassador WARNKE: Well, I think that what we ought to do is to rely not entirely on formal treaties, but instead try and engage in a sort of reciprocal arms reduction techniques that I've just discussed, their engagement by President Bush and President Gorbachev. I think, for example, the United States ought to say to the Russians, "We're going to take all of our nuclear weapons off of operational status. We're not going to launch them against you. We don't think you're going to launch yours against us;" and we think as a consequence, we ought to put an end to this Cold War risk and we ought to take all of our weapons off of operational status and put them in storage. And we're going to do it. And we hope that you will do it, too.

Now, that wouldn't require a treaty. It would be a decision by the President as Commander in Chief. And of course, he would not be giving up the nuclear weapons if all of a sudden Russia became a threat again, if they ended up with a bellicose leader who was making all kind of threatening sounds, if he was talking about trying to regain the Warsaw Pact control. We could take the weapons out of storage and put them back in their silos and in the launch tubes in the submarines. So, we wouldn't be sacrificing our long term security. We'd be recognizing the current situation which is one -- which there is not a belligerent Russia. There's a Russia that has its tremendous internal problems, but certainly is not going to try to go to war with the United States or with NATO.

MR. SAPIENZA: Okay. What would be the benefits -- I mean, you talk about the negotiations between President, for example, President Clinton and President Yeltsin. What would be the benefit of doing it that way rather than the way that these treaties are usually approved in the usual channels?

Ambassador WARNKE: Well, as they say, the difference would be that it would not be a formal treaty, that it would be a decision that could be taken on a unilateral basis, and calling for reciprocal action on the part of the Russians. If we found that they were retaining a lot of their weapons on operational status, we could stop our policy of retiring ours to storage. There'd be no treaty involved but there wouldn't have to be. It would be reciprocal steps. And we have taken reciprocal steps in the past as I mentioned with regard to tactical nuclear weapons and certainly as far as de-targeting is concerned. That didn't require a treaty. It was reciprocal action. And what I'm calling for is similar reciprocal action at this point, pending the conclusion of more formal treaties.

MR. SAPIENZA: Why do you think that the public in general is not aware or not in tune with the issue of nuclear weapons in the post Cold War era? What do you think are some of the things that?

Ambassador WARNKE: I think that the reason is that we are no longer afraid. See, the American public likes to ignore foreign affairs. They like to ignore anything that takes place outside the boundaries of the United States unless it effects economic -- economic well-being. I mean, we're concerned about the crisis in Asia because that would mean a loss of profits for American business. But as far as foreign policy generally is concerned, the American public certainly does not support military intervention abroad. You could not find a tremendous number of people who would want us even to send forces into Kosovo in the event that situation turned out to be a blood bath such as occurred in Bosnia. So, the American public doesn't like foreign policy and it doesn't like to have to worry about defense matters. We only worry about them when we're scared.

Now, it's certainly at the top of the Cuban missile crisis. Everybody was very aware of what was going on because we were scared. We were afraid of a nuclear war. And during the height of the Cold War when we did have a situation in which the Soviet Union looked as though it were a threat, people got interested. I mean, people were interested back in 1968, for example when the Soviet forces moved into Czechoslovakia. That struck the American public as being something that was foreboding -- it was -- it sort of indicated some willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to utilize military force against interests that are close to us. But today, I mean, nobody worries about Mr. Yeltsin. It's hard to picture him as being some kind of a villain. He's a bumbling old man who's rather sick. And when he's not sick, he's rather funny.

We're not afraid of the Chinese. I mean, President Clinton went to China. He was very warmly received. So, who do we got to worry about? We worry about Cuba. How many Americans worry about Cuba? It's a tiny country, and a good place to go on a vacation. Iraq? Sure. For a while when Iraq invaded Kuwait there was concern about what that may mean in terms of Middle East peace. But today? I mean, Iraq was badly defeated. Syria? Iran? They're negligible military threats.

Our military budget dwarfs the combined military budgets of everybody that we regard as a potential enemy. I mean, if you put Iraq, Iran, Cuba -- put them all together and add up their military budgets. They're a fraction of ours. Our military budget is four times that of Russia. It's something like six times that of China.

MR. SAPIENZA: It was you downstairs that mentioned it's this perception or how politicians look at Russia that has some effect on the way we approach our arms control agreements, the way we deal with them. What did you mean by that?

Ambassador WARNKE: I think we still have a tendency to treat Russia as being an enemy. And you can see that most clearly when it comes to NATO expansion. See, the argument that persuaded an awful lot of Senators to vote for NATO expansion was the idea of containing Russia. Now, the fact that Russia is not a threat anymore and doesn't need to be contained is something we have not yet come to accept. So that I think what we have really got to do if we are really interested in a stable Europe, is to integrate Russia into the rest of Europe as a friend, as a partner. I mean, that's the greatest recipe for stability, much better than trying to expand NATO and continue to treat Russia as an enemy.

MR. SAPIENZA: Does this perception bleed over into arms control when we're talking about nuclear disarmament?

Ambassador WARNKE: Oh, I think it does. Certainly. I mean, if we regard Russia as the enemy still, then we're not apt to reduce the number of weapons that we have aimed at Russia and we're going to keep them on an operational status. But if we have finally come to accept the fact that Russia is not a military threat which it is not, then we can change our general attitude toward arms control and towards the defense budget and start spending our money on things that are more important to our security.

MR. SAPIENZA: Those that advocate reducing our nuclear arsenal, all nuclear arsenals down to zero, do you think these people are being realistic?

Ambassador WARNKE: I think that it's a commendable idea. We're committed by Treaty to try and move toward nuclear disarmament. But the question is how to you get there? And they say you can't do it all at once. If you're at the top of a tall tree and try to get down to one step, you're going to kill yourself. If you go down branch by branch, you'll reach the ground safely. So, what I'm saying is take the safe steps which are clearly available to us and we will eventually reach a point in which total nuclear disarmament is possible. But as Jonathan Shell pointed out in his luncheon speech, you can't dis-invent the nuclear bomb, so the nuclear capability is always going to be there. The thing is to reduce the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. Their actual physical existence is not as threatening as the fact that they are in a threatening posture. So, if you take them off that operational status, then you can consider is there some way we can get rid of all of them?

MR. SAPIENZA: One last question. How do the recent tests in India and Pakistan plus this notion of loose nukes proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons -- how does that complicate moving forward in -- on arms reduction agreements?

Ambassador WARNKE: The India and Pakistan tests should not interfere in any way with the kind of steps we've been discussing. They say they've got at most a handful of nuclear warheads. We have thousands and thousands. We are certainly not going to be targeted by India or by Pakistan. I mean, they have those nuclear weapons for one very simple reason and that's that they're concerned about their own defense. They don't regard them as being weapons they would use for some sort of offensive purpose. India is not going to attack China and Pakistan is not going to attack India.

So, as a consequence, if what we can do at this point is move toward very substantial reduction of nuclear weapons, if what we can do is establish a sort of a contempt for nuclear weapons, that they aren't symbols of greatness, they're the residue of a past situation. They're the residue of the Cold War. And certainly the fact that now India has now tested nuclear weapons doesn't turn it into a great power. Neither Germany nor Japan has nuclear weapons. And in terms of international importance, they're infinitely more significant than India is or than India is apt to be for many, many years to come.

MR. SAPIENZA: Great. Thank you very much.

Ambassador WARNKE: You're welcome.